## Key Ideas > [!abstract] Core Concepts > > - **Expertise exists on continuum within domains**: Students may be experts in multiplication but novices in algebra - expertise is domain-specific, not general > - **Fundamental thinking differences, not just knowledge quantity**: Experts don't just know more - they categorise, process, and approach problems in qualitatively different ways > - **Novices cannot think like experts**: Asking novices to use expert strategies (metacognition, complex problem-solving) is ineffective without foundational knowledge ## Definition **Expert vs Novice Differences**: Qualitative differences in thinking patterns, knowledge organisation, and problem-solving approaches between those with extensive domain knowledge and those learning foundational skills (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). ## Connected To [[Problem-Solving]] | [[Surface and Deep Structure]] | [[Schema]] | [[Fluency]] | [[Prior Knowledge]] | [[Curse of Knowledge]] | [[Cognitive Load Theory]] | [[Misconceptions]] --- ## Core differences Experts and novices differ across several dimensions. Novices typically have defective schemas containing errors (Chi, 2008), whilst experts possess rich, interconnected knowledge networks (Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982). This means instruction must focus on building correct schemas step-by-step rather than assuming foundational understanding. When categorising problems, novices rely on surface features such as context or diagrams, whilst experts recognise deep structure and underlying principles (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). Teachers should teach principles explicitly rather than expecting novices to discover patterns through exposure. Knowledge access also differs; novices experience effortful recall with limited fluency, whilst experts retrieve information automatically from long-term memory (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). Building automaticity through extensive practice helps novices progress towards expert performance. Metacognitive skills differ qualitatively between the groups. Novices apply general strategies that often prove ineffective (Sweller et al., 2019), whilst experts use domain-specific, purposeful approaches (Chi et al., 1989). Teachers should develop domain knowledge before introducing metacognitive strategies. ## The chess research insight Chase and Simon's (1973) chess study changed understanding of expertise. Grandmasters do not think more moves ahead than novice: they recognise board patterns and retrieve optimal moves from long-term memory. Whilst novices slowly analyse individual pieces and possibilities, experts chunk complex positions into familiar patterns, reducing cognitive load (Miller, 1956; Cowan, 2001). This insight informs educational practice (Sweller, van Merriënboer, & Paas, 2019). Novices need to use thinking skills whilst experts use knowledge (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). Teachers should not ask novices to think like experts when they lack the knowledge base that makes expert thinking possible (Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006). ## Why standard advice fails Certain instructional approaches prove ineffective for novices despite their appeal. Asking novices to "think like a mathematician" or engage in complex problem-solving without foundations does not develop expertise. Metacognitive strategy instruction without domain knowledge and pattern recognition activities without underlying understanding similarly fail to produce learning gains. Effective instruction for novices follows different principles. [[Explicit Teaching]] of principles and procedures provides the foundation novices need. Building [[Fluency]] in foundational skills, correcting [[Misconceptions]] systematically, and providing extensive practice until knowledge becomes automated all support novice development towards expertise. ## Schema development process The journey from novice to expert follows a predictable progression (each stage requiring different instructional approaches; Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993). Novices must build correct schemas through explicit instruction, worked examples, and guided practice, with instruction focused on accuracy over independence (Rosenshine, 2012; Sweller & Cooper, 1985). Developing learners strengthen connections through deliberate practice and systematic error correction as support gradually fades with emerging competence (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Kalyuga et al., 2003). Experts engage in complex problem-solving and metacognitive strategy development that challenges and extends established knowledge (Chi et al., 1989). Rushing students through these stages by using expert-appropriate strategies with novices does not accelerate development. Instead, it creates confusion and misconceptions (Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006). ## Key warnings and pitfalls Teachers should not assume novices can "think their way" to expertise without a knowledge foundation (Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006). Expert teachers often experience the [[Curse of Knowledge]] and underestimate novice needs (Hinds, 1999). Surface-level similarities between novice and expert performance can mask differences in underlying cognitive processes (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). Metacognitive skills remain domain-specific and do not transfer automatically across subjects (Willingham, 2007). ## Practical examples The differences between expert and novice thinking manifest across domains. In fraction addition, an expert sees a single procedure whilst a novice must consciously process fractions, equivalent fractions, common denominators, and the addition algorithm as separate elements (Cowan, 2001). In essay writing, an expert recognises argument structures instantly whilst a novice must consciously construct topic sentences, evidence, and explanations (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). In algebra, an expert chunks 3x + 5 = 17 as a single problem type whilst a novice processes variables, operations, equality, and inverse operations separately (Miller, 1956). ## References Chase, W. G., & Simon, H. A. (1973). Perception in chess. *Cognitive Psychology*, 4(1), 55–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(73)90004-2 Chi, M. T. H. (2008). Three types of conceptual change: Belief revision, mental model transformation, and categorical shift. In S. Vosniadou (Ed.), *International handbook of research on conceptual change* (pp. 61–82). Routledge. Chi, M. T. H., Bassok, M., Lewis, M. 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